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THE BODY CORPORATE 
MIHAILIS E. DIAMANTIS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION: IT JUST GREW 
To break the law, one must have a body capable of acting. Since U.S. law is 
committed to a centuries-old legal fiction according to which corporations can 
break the law, it must have some account of the “bodies” through which 
corporations act. They may not be tangible bodies we can kick—but within the 
fiction of the law, they must be bodies that are capable of committing crimes, 
torts, and other violations. An account of this active element would identify 
which parts of corporations are capable of causing injuries that are legally 
attributable to them. Despite its obvious significance for the corporate liability 
inquiry, the body corporate remains largely untheorized. 
Failure to attend to the body corporate has led to an odd fact in the modern 
law of corporate liability: courts use the exact same doctrine for attributing both 
harmful corporate acts1 and inculpating corporate thoughts.2 For example, when 
a corporation is accused of bribery, the same legal analysis determines whether 
it paid an official and whether it did so with a corrupt motive. Earlier in the 
history of corporate law, jurists were more careful to distinguish the two.3 Yet, 
this oddity of modern doctrine seems to have escaped notice. With respect to 
individual defendants, complaining parties must take very different approaches 
to proving act elements and mental state elements. Acts are the sort of things to 
which eyewitnesses, documents, and videos can attest directly.4 Thoughts are 
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 1.  As used here, “act” refers to what philosophers would call “conduct” or “behavior.” I do not 
mean “act” to carry any implication of intentionality or responsibility. This is consistent with the legal 
use of the term. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(2) (AM. L. INST. 2020) (“‘[A]ct’ or ‘action’ means 
a bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary.”). It refers merely to physical movement. The 
fundamental question of corporate action, then, is whether and when a physical movement (e.g. of an 
employee) counts as being (also) a physical movement of the corporation. The question of whether the 
corporation acted intentionally or in a responsibility entailing way can then follow, but it is a separate 
and additional question. 
 2.  See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1831 (2015). 
 3.  See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 4.  White-collar prosecutions generally turn on mens rea because the actus reus elements are 
usually well-documented. See JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 34–35 (6th ed. 2016). 
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hidden, accessible only by inference from circumstantial evidence.5 More 
importantly, acts and thoughts play fundamentally different justice roles. Acts 
link harms to the people who cause them.6 Mental states determine whether a 
person who caused harm did so culpably.7 If someone is injured after tripping 
over an extension cord, she experiences harm. If the defendant placed the cord 
there, he caused her harm. But he caused her harm culpably only if he knew (or 
should have known) that someone might pass by. 
This Article is about the active element of the corporate structure—what I 
here call the “body corporate.” The body corporate is to be contrasted with what 
I have previously dubbed the corporate mind.8 If corporations are to be capable 
of committing the vast majority of crimes and torts, the law must have some 
stance on how corporations can satisfy the mental state elements of those 
violations. Implicit in that stance is a theory of the corporate mind, that is, what 
it means for a corporation to think or what components of a corporation are 
capable of thinking on its behalf. 
Just as the law needs an account of how corporations think if they are to be 
held to account for crimes and torts, it also needs an account of how corporations 
can act. Most crimes and torts require some affirmative act that satisfies an actus 
reus or breaches a duty. Even for inchoate violations, like attempts and 
conspiracies, the law requires some external, physical manifestation of criminal 
purpose, for example, words spoken, tools purchased, or maps drawn. So the law 
must say what it means for a corporation to cause some tangible effect in the 
world, or it must say which elements of a corporation are capable of causing 
tangible effects on its behalf. When those whom the law has recognized to be 
people cause tangible effects, the law generically refers to these effects as acts.9 
For prototypical legal people—human beings—tangible effects become their acts 
when, and only when, their bodies cause them. It stands to reason that the law 
 
 5.  See United States v. Wells, 766 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Being a state of mind, willfulness 
can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Rather, findings of willfulness usually require that fact finders 
reasonably draw inferences from the available facts.”); United States v. Stagman, 446 F.2d 489, 493 (6th 
Cir. 1971) (stating that the general rule in criminal cases is that “intent may be inferred from the totality 
of circumstances surrounding the commission of the prohibited act”). 
 6.  See Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Law’s Missing Account of Corporate Character, 17 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 865, 866–67 (2019) (noting that federal and state laws readily attribute the harmful acts of a 
corporation’s employees to the corporation itself). 
 7.  Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model 
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 689–90 (1983) (discussing how mens rea is used to grade 
the seriousness of criminal conduct). 
 8.  See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2075–76 
(2016) (“Within the fiction of the law, corporations also enter into contracts, buy property, sell goods, 
and perform all manner of acts implying they have minds.”). 
 9.  The legal sense of “act” is different from the philosophical sense. Philosophers tend to think of 
acts as being, by definition, intentional. On the law’s understanding, an act may be unintentional, 
involuntary, and unknowing; in its most basic sense, a legal act is just some physical event caused by some 
legal person. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(2) (AM. L. INST. 2020). 
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must have some account of what a corporate body is if it is to say which tangible 
effects qualify as corporate acts. 
To the corporate mind, scholars have paid ample attention. They have offered 
detailed accounts of when injurious corporate acts are culpably taken. William 
Laufer, for example, would measure corporate culpability by comparing 
corporate defendants to average corporations acting in similar ways.10 Pamela 
Bucy would look to a corporation’s ethos for evidence that it intentionally or 
culpably took some criminal act.11 In earlier work, I proposed a system for 
inferring culpable corporate mental states directly from corporate acts and the 
circumstances in which they are taken.12 Philosophers working on collective 
responsibility assume corporations can do things and then quickly turn to 
discussing what makes corporations responsible.13 The prior issue of what it 
means for a corporation to act has been an assumed and largely unanalyzed 
starting point for us all.14 Providing an answer requires an account of the body 
corporate. 
Our theories of corporate fault are necessarily incomplete. Corporations can 
be faulty without being at fault. Incurring a legal or moral debt requires the 
 
 10.  William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 701 (1994) (“Would 
an average corporation, of like size, complexity, functionality, and structure, engaging in illegal activity 
X, given circumstances Y, have the state of mind Z?”). Earlier in the same article, Laufer gets the closest 
I have seen to a detailed analysis of the body corporate, and it is worth pausing for a moment to show 
three ways in which the present Article moves beyond Laufer’s work. First, he argues for a “constructive” 
theory of corporate action, which questions whether an “entity-agent relationship [is] strong enough to 
sustain a finding of authorship? In short, is it reasonable to conclude that the illegal acts of [corporate] 
officers were the actions of [the corporation]?” Id. at 689. His discussion, however, treats “act and intent” 
as a single unit, and so does not isolate the act element. See id. at 684–89. Second, to the extent that 
Laufer does manage to isolate the body corporate as a distinct object of inquiry, his analysis effectively 
stops there. He would ask whether, in light of a corporation’s various attributes, “it is reasonable to 
conclude that the agents’ acts are the actions of the corporation.” Id. at 682. What he means by 
“reasonable” here is unclear. Later in the paper, he espouses an objective standard of reasonableness 
which, as applied to the question of corporate acts, would look to whether the acts of similar agents in 
similar corporations are acts of the corporation. Id. at 677. That analysis, however, presumes an 
antecedent theory of corporate action. Third, Laufer’s proposal makes clear that he inherits the 
assumption (shared by the law and other theorists) that corporations can only act through their agents. 
See id. at 652, 683 n. 140, 727 n. 308. As will become clear in Part IV.B, it is precisely that assumption that 
I think cannot withstand scrutiny after we successfully isolate the body corporate for analysis. 
 11.  Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991) (“The government can convict a corporation . . . only if it proves that 
the corporate ethos encouraged agents of the corporation to commit the criminal act.”). 
 12.  See generally Diamantis, supra note 8 (offering a theory of corporate mens rea motivated by 
cognitive science). 
 13.  Kendy Hess, The Free Will of Corporations (and Other Collectives), 168 PHIL. STUD. 241, 243 
(2014) (“Claims about what corporations ‘believe, ‘desire’, or ‘do’ are thus claims about commitments or 
actions that exist at the collective, corporate level.”). 
 14.  In writing this paper, I am fulfilling a debt taken out four years ago when I offered a definition 
of corporate mens rea that relies on an antecedent theory of corporate actus reus. Diamantis, supra note 
8, at 2053 (“[T]his Article assumes that there is some sensible theory of corporate actus reus—a way of 
resolving when a corporation has done something and what—nothing will turn on the details of that 
theory.”). 
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debtor to have done something. We find this obvious where individuals are 
concerned. I may hope someone dies or even intend to kill them, that makes me 
faulty. But I am not at fault for anything; I am liable for no sort of offense, unless 
and until I take steps to effectuate my hope or intent. Similarly, a corporation can 
be faulty if, as Bucy would argue, it has a defective corporate ethos, but the 
corporation cannot be at fault for anything unless and until it does something 
wrong. Defining what it means for a corporation to do something is the primary 
task of a theory of the body corporate. 
This Article’s main ambition is modest: it requests recognition of and some 
reflection on the body corporate.15 Since the body corporate comprises half of the 
liability inquiry, attention to it is far overdue. There is no straightforward answer 
for how best to conceive of the body corporate. Unlike natural bodies, corporate 
bodies have no perceptible perimeter; their implicit contours are to be found in 
statutes and cases rather than out in the world. 
As I argue below, focusing on the body corporate and the law’s role in shaping 
it may help resolve some longstanding problems in corporate law. Sometimes 
easy solutions may be hiding in plain sight, if only we have the conceptual tools 
to perceive them. By failing to distinguish the body corporate from the corporate 
mind, the law and scholars commenting on it have implicitly assumed the same 
doctrine must apply to both. This has made it too easy to propose doctrines of 
corporate liability and too hard to defend them. Raising a new theory of 
corporate liability needs two arguments to show its appeal: one evaluating its 
merits as a conception of the body corporate, and one evaluating it as a 
conception of the corporate mind. Conversely, when it comes time to defend the 
theory, a counterargument showing the theory has shortcomings as concerns the 
body corporate need not mean it has the same shortcomings as a theory of the 
corporate mind, and vice versa. 
Historical inertia, rather than policy-driven and empirically-informed 
analysis, has set the current legal and academic standards, which implicitly limit 
the body corporate to individual employees. In other words, a corporation can 
only be legally liable for a harm if the harm is traceable to the conduct of its 
employees. Yet there are other entities, mechanisms, and systems within 
corporations that also cause harm for which sound legal policy would hold 
corporations accountable. By excluding these other sources of harm from the 
body corporate, the law obfuscates corporations’ capacity to cause harm and their 
responsibility for it. A policy-driven approach to the body corporate would 
 
 15.  Matthew Caulfield suggested that I frame the discussion in terms of corporate agency rather 
than corporate bodies. On the approach he prefers, the question would be: “What things in the world are 
loci of corporate agency?” Whereas I ask: “What things in the world are part of the body corporate?” To 
my mind, these are equivalent questions. The advantage of my formulation is that its tongue-in-cheek 
character (corporations obviously do not really have bodies) is universally apparent and emphasizes the 
need for a policy driven response. While, as I think, corporations also do not really have agency either, 
there is not universal agreement on that point. Some readers, were they pursuing a question on corporate 
agency, may veer too deeply into misguided metaphysics, a detour from which many have never returned. 
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eschew the simplistic metaphysics according to which the body corporate can 
only be identified with individual employees. Were the law to recognize other 
significant sources of corporate harm as parts of the body corporate, it could hold 
corporations to account for more of the harms they cause and incentivize them 
to undertake necessary reform. 
This Article begins in Part II by pointing to the likely source of our long-
lasting collective neglect of the body corporate. Legal doctrines tell courts how 
to identify when corporations have engaged in misconduct. “Mis-conduct” is an 
amalgam of two elements: an act, that is, the conduct; and a mental state, that is, 
that which renders the conduct amiss. We moderns, commenting on and 
critiquing the law, have inherited this conflation. 
What the law conflates, Part III seeks to distinguish. The act and mental state 
elements of corporate liability should do different work in corporate law. By 
failing to separate them, the two-dimensional landscape of corporate liability 
flattens. To capture the nuance that the liability inquiry should have, the law must 
isolate the distinct contributions of the body corporate and of the corporate mind. 
In this Article’s main theoretical contribution, Part III characterizes each in a 
way that firmly establishes their difference. 
Part IV illustrates some of the work the body corporate can do. Few scholars 
favor the current law of corporate liability, but they criticize it for the wrong 
reason. Most think the law is too punitive because it holds corporations to 
account for the misconduct of all employees, even low-level clerks and subversive 
rogues. Like current law, most commentators tend to conflate the two dimensions 
of the corporate liability inquiry. If scholars were to distinguish the body 
corporate from the corporate mind, they would likely no longer default to 
endorsing a single view for both. Critics are right that current doctrine sweeps 
too broadly as regards the corporate mind. However, as argued below, the law 
overlooks potentially important parts of the body corporate, like aggregate 
employee action and corporate organizational systems. In so doing, it ignores 
important sources of corporate harm, thereby shortchanging the corporate 
liability inquiry. 
Space constraints do not permit a searching discussion of all types of 
corporate liability. In what follows, I focus on criminal law.16 While corporate 
crimes are far from representative of corporate misconduct generally, the 
operative doctrines of liability are familiar to the general part of corporate law. 
Criminal law is a handy test case because of its clearer linguistic distinction 
between “actus reus” and “mens rea.” While the arguments below will resonate 
with other types of corporate liability, they may need some adjustment to fit 
snugly. 
 
 16.  For a short primer on the current state of corporate criminal law, see generally Mihailis E. 
Diamantis & William S. Laufer, Prosecution and Punishment of Corporate Criminality, 15 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 453 (2019). 
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While civil law scholars have wrangled more openly with what I call the body 
corporate, they have done so largely within the framework of current doctrine.17 
This Article attempts to go beyond careful parsing of when employees should or 
should not be included as parts of the body corporate. It takes a more open-ended 
approach by considering whether other, possibly non-human, aspects of 
corporations should be included too. 
Corporate criminal law is also an appealing place to start because the stakes 
for getting the right answer are so high. The economic loss attributable to white-
collar crime outpaces all other crime by twenty-to-one.18 Most white-collar crime 
occurs in institutional settings—like corporate workplaces—that provide its 
necessary preconditions like access to information, markets, and technology.19 A 
century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that corporate criminal law is an 
essential tool for controlling white-collar crime.20 Corporations can 
(dis)incentivize, (dis)empower, and (dis)allow misconduct.21 Failure to calibrate 
the law’s understanding of the body corporate misaligns corporate incentives to 
invest in effective compliance.22 This means more victims, more social costs, and 
less justice. The law can do better. 
 
 17.  See generally Patrick Hornbeck, Respondeat Superior Vicarious Liability for Clergy Sexual 
Abuse: Four Approaches, 68 BUFFALO L. REV. 975 (2020) (discussing church liability for sexual assault 
by priests); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 
(2016) (discussing corporate liability for discrimination by algorithms). 
 18.  Compare RODNER HUFF, CHRISTIAN DESILETS & JOHN KANE, THE 2010 NATIONAL PUBLIC 
SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 12 (2010), http://www.fraudaid.com/library/2010-national-public-
survey-on-white-collar-crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/A22Z-5YG4] (“[The] approximate the annual cost of 
white collar crime [is] between $300 and $660 billion.”), with KATHRYN E. MCCOLLISTER, MICHAEL T. 
FRENCH & HAI FANG, THE COST OF CRIME TO SOCIETY: NEW CRIME-SPECIFIC ESTIMATES FOR 
POLICY AND PROGRAM EVALUATION (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2835847 
[https://perma.cc/B3FD-ZUNE] (“[M]ore than 23 million criminal offenses were committed in 2007, 
resulting in approximately $15 billion in economic losses to the victims.”). 
 19.  Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2004) (“Many of the [white collar crimes] referred to above are most likely to 
occur within the context of complex institutions, such as large corporations, partnerships, and 
government agencies.”). 
 20.  New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) (“In 
that class of crimes we see no good reason why corporations may not be held responsible . . . . If it were 
not so, many offenses might go unpunished and acts be committed in violation of law where, as in the 
present case, the statute requires all persons, corporate or private, to refrain from certain practices, 
forbidden in the interest of public policy.”). 
 21.  See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1625 (2007) 
(“Enterprise liability has been the legal system’s chief response to both problems: how firms incentivize 
their agents ex ante to comply with or violate the law, and how firms impede or assist the state in detecting 
and sanctioning violations ex post.”). 
 22.  See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Functional Corporate Knowledge, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 329 
(2019) (discussing the concern that the law could over- or under-incentivize corporations to invest in 
compliance). 
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II 
THE VANISHING BODY CORPORATE 
Criminal law’s recognition of the body corporate has waxed and waned over 
the centuries. In the beginning, corporations had no bodies so far as criminal law 
was concerned.23 Nor, for that matter, did they have minds. As the Missouri 
Supreme Court observed in the mid-nineteenth century, “[A] bank is a 
corporation—it cannot utter words—it has no tongue—no hands to commit an 
assault and battery with—no mind, heart or soul to be put into motion by 
malice.”24 Indeed, the ultra vires doctrine limited criminal law’s ability to see 
corporations at all.25 Under this doctrine, corporations literally could do and 
think no wrong because, as a matter of law, they could never do or think anything 
beyond the scope of their chartered purposes. Early charters limited corporate 
purposes to narrow public works projects like building railroads or installing 
waterworks.26 They did not then permit, as modern charters do,27 the open-ended 
pursuit of any lawful purpose, and they certainly did not anticipate criminal 
activity. This did not mean there was no white-collar crime. Employees have 
always misused their positions for personal advantage.28 However, until the turn 
of the Nineteenth Century, employees did so solely in their individual capacities, 
not as extensions of their corporate employers.29 Criminal justice and deterrence 
only applied at the individual level. 
As criminal law shed the constraints of the ultra vires doctrine, it began to 
recognize corporations as capable of acting harmfully, even before it saw them as 
 
 23.  See also Bank of Ithaca v. King, 12 Wend. 390, 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (“[S]urely [a 
corporation] has no corporeal body. It has no material existence, it is incapable of performing labor and, 
therefore, cannot be compelled to perform an impossibility.”). 
 24.  Childs v. Bank of Mo., 17 Mo. 213, 215 (1852). 
 25.  See Albert J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 35 
YALE L.J. 13, 23 (1925); Ultra Vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the phrase as 
“[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law”); see 
generally W. Robert Thomas, How and Why Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons Under the 
Criminal Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479, 508–10 (2018) (discussing shifting inter-related policies on the 
ultra vires doctrine in civil and criminal law). 
 26.  See Constructive Notice of the Charter of a Corporation, 26 HARV. L. REV. 531, 541 (1913) (“In 
the early days of corporations when charters were sparingly granted by public act and usually for a quasi-
public purpose a charter was properly regarded as a very special privilege.”). 
 27.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2020); Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate 
Criminal Liability: Seeking A Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in 
Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 806 (1996) (“By the end of the [Nineteenth] century, states 
moved away from granting limited corporate charters toward permitting businesses to incorporate freely 
and to operate for any legal purpose.”). 
 28.  See, e.g., The Case of the Carrier Who Broke Bulk, YB 13 Edw. 4, fol. 9, Pasch, pl. 5 (1473) 
(Eng.), reprinted in 64 Selden Society 30 (1945). 
 29.  Daniel Lipton, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: Defining Corporate Personhood at 
the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1926 (2010) (“Under the prevailing common law, 
corporate criminal acts . . . were considered to be ultra vires.”). 
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thinking wrongly.30 The now-lost distinction between the body corporate and the 
corporate mind once played an important, if short-lived, role in legal theory. Civil 
law had long used the doctrine of respondeat superior to define corporations’ 
capacity to act.31 That doctrine identified the body corporate with individual 
employee bodies. Accordingly, a corporation engaged in tortious misconduct 
alongside any of its employees who did the same within the scope of their 
employment and with some intent to benefit the corporation.32 When criminal 
law first recognized the possibility of corporate crime, it initially limited 
respondeat superior to employee acts. Corporations could only be convicted of 
strict liability crimes, which have only act elements and no mental state 
elements.33 Corporations had the capacity to cause criminal harms through their 
employees, courts reasoned, but lacked the moral hardware necessary for 
wrongful thoughts and true culpability. 
In 1909, the Supreme Court recognized the shortcomings of limiting 
corporate enforcement to strict liability crimes. But moving to more general 
enforcement would necessitate an extended fiction according to which 
corporations could have minds as well as bodies.34 In New York Central & 
Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,35 the Court entertained due process 
challenges brought by shareholders of a railroad convicted of offering illegal 
shipping rebates.36 The mental state element of the crime was the doctrinal 
 
 30.  Historically, this has also been the tradition in civil law countries, which tend to be skeptical of 
corporations’ capacity to have culpable mens rea. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the 
Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 28 (1957) (“Apart from a few temporary and partial exceptions the 
maxim that societas delinquere non potest is still firmly recognized in the civil law.”); id. at 29 (“[French] 
courts reason that corporate criminal liability is irreconcilable with the guilt principle, i.e., the doctrine 
of mens rea, which is the true basis of all criminal law.”). 
 31.  JOHN W. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF LIABILITY 
FOR CIVIL INJURIES 57–58 (3d ed. 1912); see, e.g., Phila., Wilmington, and Balt. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 
U.S. 202, 209–10 (1858) (“As a necessary correlative to the principle of the exercise of corporate powers 
and faculties by legal representatives, is the recognition of a corporate responsibility for the acts of those 
representatives.”). Some trace the doctrine as far back as Roman times. See Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr., 
Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 350 (1891) (“[T]he unlimited liability of an owner for the torts of his slave 
grew out of what had been merely a privilege of buying him off from a surrender to the vengeance of the 
offended party, in both the early Roman and the early German law.”). 
 32.  Corporations, supra note 2, § 1841. 
 33.  See, e.g., Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924, 926 (Colo. 1904) (holding a corporation 
liable for “not strictly observing the law, rather than an intentional disregard of its provisions.”); see also 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(2) (AM. L. INST. 2020) (“When absolute liability is imposed for the 
commission of an offense, a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation shall be assumed, 
unless the contrary plainly appears.”). 
 34.  William Thomas traces corporate criminal liability to an earlier date. William R. Thomas, 
Incapacitating Corporate Criminals, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905, 914–15 (2019); Thomas, supra note 25, at 513 
& n. 159 (2018) (including sources for the proposition that “the Supreme Court was hardly at the 
vanguard of innovation; several state supreme courts had already held corporations criminally 
responsible for general-intent crimes, and courts soon extended these holdings to include specific-intent 
crimes.”). 
 35.  212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 36.  Id. at 490–92. 
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sticking point. If the railroad purposely or knowingly offered discounted rates, it 
would be guilty of a misdemeanor.37 Applying respondeat superior to the mental 
state elements, as the prosecution asked the Court to do, would breathe 
intelligence into corporations, attributing to them not only their employees’ acts 
but also their employees’ thoughts. It would also entail vicariously transferring 
fault to corporate employers, in possible violation of due process. 
In an opinion based (by the Court’s own admission) more on “public policy” 
than legal analysis, the Court determined that corporations’ rise to economic and 
social prominence necessitated more tools of control.38 Relying on criminal 
statutes that happened to permit strict liability was no longer enough. To change 
course, criminal law had to recognize that corporations could harbor mens rea. 
The Court made it so: 
[T]he corporation, which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents 
and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its 
agents . . . whose knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the corporation for 
which the agents act.39 
Today, respondeat superior defines the perimeter of both the body corporate 
and the corporate mind. But a curious thing has happened since New York 
Central: We have lost sight of the fact that respondeat superior is doing double 
duty. Courts and scholars, wooed by the tidiness of respondeat superior, now 
tend to speak of corporate crime but not of separate criminal acts and culpable 
mental states. The usual modern-day backstop to fumbled doctrine in corporate 
criminal law is “the good sense of prosecutors,”40 but that “good sense” fares no 
better as regards the body corporate. Since the early days of Eric Holder’s 1991 
Memo to U.S. Attorneys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations 
(Holder Memo),41 the Department of Justice (DOJ) policy inherited the 
conceptual coarseness of current doctrine. The Holder Memo states that “a 
corporation may be held criminally liable for the illegal acts of its directors, 
officers, employees, and agents.”42 Vicarious liability for “illegal acts” presumes 
that actus reus and mens rea travel together. 
Losing track of the body corporate and the corporate mind as distinct 
enforcement concerns can trip up legal analysis and efforts at reform. As one 
commentator reports, some courts “have asked whether the responsible 
individual whose conduct provided the basis for imputing liability to the 
 
 37.  49 U.S.C. § 14903 (2018). 
 38.  N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 212 U.S. at 495. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943). 
 41.  Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All Competent Heads and U.S. 
Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter The Holder 
Memo on Prosecuting Corporations]. 
 42.  Id. 
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corporation represented the ‘brains’ of the organization.”43 That sort of inquiry 
overtly conflates mind and body, as if brain and hand were one and the same. 
Another commentator writes “that actions of employees can be aggregated and 
imputed to the corporation as a whole,” but then cites a case that aggregates the 
act of one employee with the mental state of another.44 Many scholars transition 
seamlessly from discussing corporate crime, to the body corporate, to the 
corporate mind.45 
Modern commentators are not to blame. Respondeat superior, which sets the 
terms of most discussions, applies to acts and mental states. So it is natural to 
lump body and mind together in critical analysis. In the days before New York 
Central, when corporations legally had one but not the other,46 the body 
corporate and the corporate mind were more carefully distinguished. Melding the 
two seems to have been part of a deliberate intellectual effort. A few years after 
New York Central, Henry W. Edgerton would make the case in the Yale Law 
Journal: 
The tradition that the physical movements of a corporation’s representatives may, but 
their mental states may not, be attributed to it for criminal purposes, seems as inept as 
it is persistent. There is no occasion for such a distinction between the various parts of 
the human animal; if what his hands do may properly be attributed to the corporation 
for which he acts, what his brains do may be attributed to it with equal propriety.47 
We have lived in Edgerton’s world ever since. 
III 
RE-MEMBERING THE BODY CORPORATE 
Corporate criminal law was conceptually richer before New York Central was 
decided and Edgerton’s paradigm set in. On the standard present-day 
understanding, respondeat superior is a “doctrine [for] holding an employer . . . 
liable for [its] employee’s . . . wrongful acts.”48 But using “wrongful” act as the 
unit of analysis is too blunt. There are two components to wrongful acts in 
criminal law: actus reus and mens rea. Each fulfills a distinct role in sorting the 
 
 43.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 230 n.135 (1991). 
 44.  Stacey Neumann Vu, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of 
Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 471 n.58 (2004). 
 45.  See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 
526 (2006) (“Logically, the more tightly the rule is fastened to institutional blameworthiness, the more 
that the practice of entity criminal liability will retain its justification, its bite, and its utility as a means of 
education . . . . A rule deeming virtually all crimes committed by institutional agents in institutional 
settings to be institutional crimes is easy to apply but plainly does not fit with any persuasive account of 
the relationship between institutional effects and individual conduct.”) (emphasis added). 
 46.  See Ervin Hacker, Penal Ability and Responsibility of the Corporate Bodies, 14 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 91, 91–97 (1923) (observing that, as corporate power expanded, legislatures and courts 
expanded corporate liability beyond the acts of employees by holding corporations to account for both 
“will and action”). 
 47.  Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Liability, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 840–41 (1927). 
 48.  Respondeat Superior, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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punishable from the blameless.49 In assessing the advisability of current law, we 
should evaluate respondeat superior twice, once as applied to the body corporate 
and once as applied to the corporate mind. 
To reclaim its lost conceptual nuance, the law must recall its forgotten 
distinction between the body corporate and the corporate mind. People act with 
bodies and think with minds. So the range of acts and thoughts that the law 
recognizes correlates directly to its understanding of bodies and minds. This 
conceptual truth is even more significant where the “people” at issue are 
corporations, who can act and think only within the law’s pretense and whose 
bodies and minds are themselves legal constructs.50 While the law should have 
two separate theories of attribution responsive to the different roles that body 
and mind play in criminal justice, it has only one: a corporation (body and mind) 
is its employees (bodies and minds).51 
A. The Corporate Mind 
Prying the mind and body apart calls for definitions responsive to the distinct 
roles that mind and body play in criminal justice. Minds are the seats of mental 
states, and mental states serve as the measure of culpability for harm caused. A 
harm in the absence of culpability is usually just that—a mere harm of no legal 
significance. The addition of mens rea—negligence, recklessness, knowledge, or 
purpose—changes that fundamentally. The type of attending mental state 
provides a measure of culpability, with negligence on the low end and purpose 
on the high. 
The general role of minds in criminal law suggests an abstract definition of 
the corporate mind: 
The Corporate Mind (relativized): The aspects, mechanisms, and 
features of a corporation by reference to which culpable mental 
states are legally attributable to it.52 
Since the definition refers to legally attributable harms, it is relativized to a legal 
system of concern. By looking to how the law attributes culpable mental states, 
one can read off its implicit theory of mind. Under current U.S. law, the corporate 
 
 49.  Both are generally required. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the 
criminal law, both a culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to 
occur.”). Most significant corporate crimes have mental state requirements. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, 
The Extended Corporate Mind: When Corporations Use AI to Break the Law, 91 N.C. L. REV. 893, 909 
(2020). 
 50.  Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (defining “person”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 316 (1945) (“[T]he corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as 
though it were a fact . . . .”). 
 51.  The doctrine is more complex than this introductory statement of it and includes important 
limitations. I discuss those below. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 52.  Again, the focus here is on culpable mental states. Outside of criminal law, such as in the case of 
agreement to a contract, a broader definition would encompass other mental states (like agreement to a 
contract). 
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mind supervenes on the minds of the individual employees, so long as they are 
working within the scope of their employment and intend to benefit the 
corporation.53 A deficient theory of the corporate mind will punish corporations 
even when they are not truly culpable, will overlook corporate culpability when 
it is present, or will fail to assist the criminal law in carrying out its preventive 
agenda. The many scholars who, like Laufer and Bucy, propose different 
measures of corporate culpability offer competing aspirational theories of the 
corporate mind.54 These authors believe respondeat superior is a deficient theory 
of the corporate mind and seek to replace it.55 Since the corporate mind is already 
the subject of robust discussion, I will not dwell on it further here.56 
B. The Body Corporate 
Bodies fulfill a different role in criminal law. People can ultimately only be 
criminally culpable for the actions they take.57 Mental states, standing alone, have 
no tangible harmful effects and are not subject to sanction.58 Bodies help the 
criminal law decipher when an act has occurred and whose act it was. Acts are 
important to the criminal law because they help to pair harms with potential 
defendants. A harm with no agential source—for example, a building toppled by 
an earthquake or a hiker gored by a bear—is of no interest to the criminal law. 
When a branch cracks a person’s skull, it makes all the difference in the world 
whether it fell from a tree or another person swung it. By finding out whose hand 
was on the branch, the law can trace the harm back to the right defendant. 
Characterizing corporate bodies is a very different criminal theory task than 
characterizing individual bodies. The bodies of natural people precede the law. 
There is no heavy theoretical lifting for the law to do.59 Human beings have an 
 
 53.  V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens 
Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 369–70 (1999) (“[F]ederal courts use respondeat superior to impute one agent’s 
acts and mens rea to the corporation.”). 
 54.  See supra notes 11–12. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  I dwell on it in considerable detail in Diamantis, supra note 8. 
 57.  Of course, people can also be liable for omissions, i.e. failures to act. To be liable for an omission, 
a defendant must have had the capacity to perform the omitted act. So legal responsibility for omission 
necessitates a corresponding theory of action. Also, we sometimes speak as though people can be liable 
for the acts of others, as when a defendant hires a third party to kill his victim. We say the defendant is 
guilty of murder though he did not pull the trigger, but the source of his liability lies in his own acts—
hiring the assassin. 
 58.  Gabriel S. Mendlow, Why Is It Wrong to Punish Thought?, 127 YALE L.J. 2342, 2345 (2018) 
(“It’s a venerable maxim of criminal jurisprudence that the state must never punish people for their mere 
thoughts.”). 
 59.  There are philosophically interesting questions about human bodies. Is the perimeter of the 
human body wide enough to include prosthetic parts, or is the body limited to some narrower core? The 
question, though, is not legally interesting. Suppose the defendant bludgeoned his victim using his 
prosthetic hand. His guilt is the same regardless of whether the prosthetic hand is part of his body or 
merely attached to a limb that is part of his body. Where corporate bodies are concerned, every part is 
artificial. There is no recourse to a naturally occurring and uncontroversial “narrow core.” 
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intuitive corporeal perimeter, coterminous with their organism. In contrast, the 
body corporate is a legal construct.60 It exists only in the way and to the extent 
that the law dictates. This makes the effort to define the body corporate both 
daunting and liberating. The law must conjure an answer because it can look 
nowhere else. But the law also gets to conjure an answer that aligns with sound 
policy. 
We can reverse engineer a given legal system’s implicit definition of the body 
corporate by looking to the role that bodies are supposed to play—pairing harms 
with defendants. As explained above, the law understands acts of legal people to 
be effects caused by bodies.61 There is a three-part relationship between legal 
people, their bodies, and the legally attributable effects those bodies cause. 
Where the effects of concern are harms—as is the case in criminal law and tort 
law—we can triangulate to an implicit theory of the body corporate by seeing 
how the law pairs harmful effects with legal people, such as: 
The Body Corporate (relativized): The aspects, mechanisms, and 
features of a corporation the harmful effects of which are legally 
attributable to it.62 
Like the definition of the corporate mind from the previous part, this 
definition keys the body corporate to a prior legal understanding of harm 
attribution. In a legal system that attributes no harms to corporations—as was 
the case with U.S. criminal law under the sway of the ultra vires doctrine—there 
are no bodies corporate. In modern times, respondeat superior largely identifies 
the body corporate with the bodies of individual employees. Their acts—taken 
within the scope of their employment and with some intent to benefit the 
corporation—are corporate acts. The harms their acts cause are legally 
attributable to their corporate employers.63 
The relativized definition of the body corporate is purely descriptive. It only 
says what a given legal system—at least implicitly—takes the body corporate to 
be. In order to evaluate whether a legal system characterizes the body corporate 
too broadly or too narrowly, we need a more idealized aspirational definition 
keyed to the broader purposes of corporate criminal law. In contrast to the 
vigorous debate concerning the corporate mind, proposing an idealized definition 
of the body corporate is relatively untouched theoretical terrain. 
 
 60.  Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental 
Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1342 (1974) (“[A]lthough American law has long accepted the independent 
juridical status of corporations, no one would suggest today that such entities are anything but legal 
constructs.”). 
 61.  Philosophers of action also recognize the tight conceptual connection between action and 
causation. I perform the action of making a fist just by causing my hand to close. If, in making a fist, I 
cause the egg in my hand to crack, then I have also performed the act of cracking the egg. 
 62.  Since the focus of this Article is criminal law, harmful effects are the effects that matter. Outside 
of criminal law, the definition might include beneficial effects too. 
 63.  They are also employee harms, i.e. harms attributable to employees in their individual capacities. 
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In coming to an aspirational definition, it is helpful to return to first principles. 
Corporate criminal law aims to dole out punishment to those who culpably cause 
harm and to prevent those harms from recurring. A broad vision of the body 
corporate would best allow the criminal law to achieve those goals. By expanding 
the range of harms that count as corporate harms, a broad definition would allow 
the law to consider more possible points of corporate social control. An overly 
narrow theory of the body corporate would fail to recognize from the start which 
harms are properly corporate harms and thereby abort the liability inquiry too 
early. These considerations motivate the following definition: 
The Body Corporate (aspirational): The aspects, mechanisms, and 
features of a corporation that cause harm. 
By adopting a capacious understanding of criminal defendants’ capacity to 
produce harmful effects—and hence a capacious understanding of their bodies—
criminal law can maximize its ability to punish harms that deserve punishment 
and deter harms that can be deterred. The aspirational definition of the body 
corporate provides a benchmark by which to assess relativized definitions of the 
body corporate implicit in law. 
A few observations about the aspirational definition of the body corporate 
are in order. Readers may have noticed that the aspirational definition 
characterizes the body corporate in terms of causation rather than action. This 
may seem puzzling since I originally introduced the body corporate in terms of 
corporate acts. The substitution is innocuous. An alternative definition would 
identify the body corporate with those features, aspects, and mechanisms through 
which corporations act harmfully. But a harmful act is just one that causes harm. 
Acting harmfully and causing harm are criminal law equivalents. The advantage 
of phrasing the aspirational definition in terms of causation rather than action is 
that the former uses the more familiar concept of corporate causation rather than 
the more obscure, philosophical notion of collective action.64 
The aspirational definition is intentionally very broad. Some may worry that 
it would lead to a dramatic and unjustified expansion of corporate criminal 
liability. It must be remembered, though, that the body corporate is only one-half 
of the criminal justice inquiry. Causing harm alone is generally not sufficient for 
liability. A culpable mental state must accompany the harmful act. The body 
corporate only helps the law identify when a corporation satisfies the actus reus. 
The impact of the aspirational definition, were it carried into law, would be 
significantly tempered by the culpability requirement. Even under the 
 
 64.  Strictly speaking, the definition is circular since I aim to characterize corporate acts in terms of 
the body corporate and the body corporate in terms of corporate causation, which, as I have said, is tied 
to corporate action. Breaking that definitional circle will require more detailed work that goes beyond 
the modest theoretical ambitions of this Article. I have begun to make some steps in that direction. See 
generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Algorithms Acting Badly: A Solution from Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
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aspirational definition, no corporation would be held to account for any harm to 
which it did not bear a culpable relation. 
The response in the previous paragraph may now raise the opposite worry: 
Does the aspirational definition go far enough? After all, if the definition seeks 
to be expansive, it could go further. My proposed definition imposes a causation 
constraint—only those mechanisms, aspects, or features of corporations that 
cause harm qualify as part of the body corporate. By removing the causation 
constraint, even more harms could be attributable to corporations. 
That more expansive approach would be unappealing for several reasons. 
First, it would generate a vision of the body corporate as omnipresent. While 
there may be some capitalists who would find this deific vision of the body 
corporate comforting, it is deeply counter-intuitive. Second, forcing the liability 
inquiry to consider a defendant’s culpability when causation is absent is wasteful. 
A defendant who in no way causally contributed to a harm will have had no 
culpable hand in it and no way of preventing it in the future. Finally, without a 
causation constraint, the body corporate could no longer help the criminal law 
pair harms with potential corporate defendants. If one corporation is an 
omnipresent source of all harm under the operative definition of the body 
corporate, then all corporations are. This would mean that all harms would 
become attributable to all corporations. Causation helps narrow the criminal 
justice inquiry to a set of potential defendants. 
The aspirational definition refers vaguely to harms that corporations cause. 
Clearly not all harms are relevant. Some harms are too minor to concern the 
criminal law, for example, the aesthetic harm of a poorly designed logo. Others 
may be outweighed by concurrent social benefits, for example, the harm to a 
competitor’s market share brought about by a superior product. Others still may 
simply be beyond the legitimate interests of the criminal law, for example, harm 
to some interest groups from effective corporate speech. Rather than attempt the 
heroic task of characterizing the harms at issue, the conservative route I prefer is 
to use “harm” to refer to the sorts of harms with which criminal law currently 
concerns itself, that is, those harms which, if they are culpably caused, potentially 
subject a person to criminal sanction. Readers who find the scope of present-day 
criminal law’s concern unappealing should substitute their preferred definition 
of legally relevant harm. 
IV 
PUTTING THE BODY CORPORATE TO WORK: RESPONDEAT INFERIOR 
This Part showcases some of the work that conceptualizing the body 
corporate can do. It gives new critical perspectives on issues at the heart of 
corporate criminal law. By bringing the lens of the body corporate to bear, we 
can better see overlooked features of what works, what does not, and why. 
Respondeat superior is the central doctrine and chief embarrassment of 
corporate criminal law. No scholar to my knowledge embraces it without 
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reservation, regardless of whether he or she otherwise supports65 or opposes66 
corporate criminal liability. Roughly speaking, the doctrine states that 
corporations think what their individual employees think and they do what their 
individual employees do. It stands as a mockery of every purpose of corporate 
criminal law: retributive,67 deterrent,68 and rehabilitative.69 It defies common 
sense, or, at least, what psychologists know about the ordinary understanding of 
corporate responsibility.70 Its implicit metaphysics would puzzle any social 
ontologist.71 Its policy implications would make even an economist blush.72 
It should come as no surprise that respondeat superior does a poor job. The 
doctrine was not developed for criminal law. Nor even for corporate law. The 
doctrine has its origins in Seventeenth Century common law of agency, more than 
a hundred years before the first true corporation was born. Later pressed with 
the need for a mechanism to hold corporations liable, Congress and the courts 
uncritically borrowed the doctrine from agency law to civil corporate law, and 
then from there to criminal corporate law. They did this despite the 
fundamentally different goals of the different legal regimes.73 
Respondeat superior’s critics in criminal law are right to be discontent, but 
not always for the right reasons. Most commentators say the doctrine is 
overinclusive.74 Surely, the argument goes, it cannot be that every employee, at 
 
 65.  See Laufer, supra note 10, at 678. 
 66.  John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1358 (“By creating respondeat superior criminal liability, the Court 
authorized a form of vicarious collective punishment that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles 
of a liberal society.”). 
 67.  See id. at 1329 (arguing that “[corporate criminal liability] should be explicitly overruled” 
because it attributes moral responsibility where there is none). 
 68.  Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: 
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 734 (1992) (“This use of enterprise liability cannot be 
defended on the ground that it promotes optimal deterrence; in fact, enterprise liability appears more 
likely to shelter individual wrongdoers from liability than to deter them.”). 
 69.  See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate 
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507, 545 (2018) (“[Suppose] a rogue employee commits a crime—which 
would be attributable to the corporation via respondeat superior—and is immediately fired. The 
corporation who fires the rogue employee may thereby have eliminated the chance that the criminal 
conduct could recur. If the corporation is in no need of reform, there is no need for character-directed 
punishment.”). 
 70.  See, e.g., Scott T. Allison & David M. Messick, The Group Attribution Error, 21 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 563, 564 (1985) (discussing findings of error in “people’s tendency to 
infer the attitudes of an entire social group strictly on the basis of one group member’s behavior”). 
 71.  See, e.g., Leo Townsend, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, 1 J. SOC. 
ONTOLOGY 183, 184 (2015) (reviewing Raimo Tuomela, SOCIAL ONTOLOGY: COLLECTIVE 
INTENTIONALITY AND GROUP AGENTS (2013)) (describing Tuomela’s “reticen[ce] to count groups as 
rational agents in the same sense, or to the same degree, as individual humans”). 
 72.  See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the 
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 565–81, 608–09 (1988) 
(weighing the efficiencies and inefficiencies of vicarious liability in different factual circumstances). 
 73.  See generally Coffee, supra note 43. 
 74.  See infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text. 
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least not the lowliest clerk75 nor the rogue defying orders,76 is equally identifiable 
with the corporation as a whole, capable of committing crime on its behalf. 
However, this familiar criticism, framed in terms of criminal liability, conflates 
the doctrine’s application to the body corporate and to the corporate mind. 
Distinguishing the two allows for a more nuanced stance. As argued below, 
however right critics may be about respondeat superior’s overbreadth as a 
doctrine for the corporate mind, it is unequivocally underinclusive when it comes 
to the body corporate. 
A. The Standard View: Respondeat Superior is Overbroad 
Identifying corporations with their employees for criminal law purposes—as 
respondeat superior does—may make some initial conceptual sense. The whole 
point of corporations is that they can do things—install electric grids, purchase 
properties, manufacture toothpaste, etc. Since corporations cannot act on their 
own, anything they do, the thought goes, they must do through their employees.77 
According to the standard critique, however, respondeat superior is too 
broad. When respondeat superior identifies corporations with their employees, 
it means all employees, from the C-suite down to the most recently hired summer 
recruit, and regardless of role—executive, managerial, technical, custodial, etc.78 
Arguably, though, not all employees equally embody their corporate employers. 
This is why the American Law Institute (ALI) endorses a more restrictive 
“control group” approach79 that only attributes to corporations conduct that 
involves “high managerial agents.”80 The control group approach is supposed to 
make more sense metaphysically by limiting corporate accountability to “those 
agents possessing sufficient power and responsibility within the firm that they 
represent ‘alter egos’ to the corporation.”81 It is also supposed to make better 
economic sense. Trying to induce corporations to monitor every employee all of 
 
 75.  Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen 
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 110 (2006) (criticizing jury instructions that allow conviction 
“regardless of whether the agent in question was a low-level employee or a high-level officer”). 
 76.  George R. Skupski, The Senior Management Mens Rea: Another Stab at a Workable Integration 
of Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263, 273 (2011) 
(“[R]espondeat-superior-based liability likely creates contrary control incentives due to its creation of 
constructive strict liability. This effect is best exemplified in cases where a rogue agent acts contrary to 
corporate policies and well-intentioned efforts to control the subordinate’s conduct.”). 
 77.  See The Holder Memo on Prosecuting Corporations, supra note 41, at 141. 
 78.  Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (“[T]he corporation 
may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial, employees.”). 
 79.  It has also been called the “inner circle test.” Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the 
Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 21, 44 (1957). 
 80.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. L. INST. 2020) (requiring, as a condition of 
attribution to a corporation, that “the commission of the offense [be] authorized, requested, commanded, 
performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf 
of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment”). 
 81.  Coffee, supra note 43, at 230 n.135. 
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the time would be a wasteful and futile project.82 The control group approach sets 
a more modest, achievable goal. Though some states have adopted the ALI’s 
approach,83 most jurisdictions, including all federal courts, have stuck with 
respondeat superior.84 
Judicial refinement of respondeat during the Twentieth Century has only 
exacerbated critics’ concerns. Courts have weakened the doctrine’s scope-of-
employment and intent-to-benefit limitations to near inconsequentiality. An 
employee now works “within the scope of [her] employment” even if she acts 
against direct orders, violates corporate policy, and subverts compliance efforts.85 
She “intends to benefit” her corporate employer even if her intent was 
“befuddled,” subsidiary, and in fact harmed the corporation.86 
In light of such developments, “there is virtually unanimous agreement: 
corporate criminal liability [under respondeat superior] is extremely broad.”87 
Though there are some notable exceptions,88 comments like the following 
predominate: 
• “Respondeat superior is an overbroad doctrine in the criminal context . . 
. .”89 
 
 82.  Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 743, 764 (1992) (“The drafters of the Code appear to have believed that a corporation should not 
be judged culpable for the mere act of a ‘rogue employee,’ and attempted to correct the overinclusiveness 
of the doctrine of respondeat superior by providing a genuine theory of corporate entity culpability.”). 
 83.  Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS 
L.J. 593, 630 (1988) (“[T]wenty-one states . . . have adopted a [control group test] analog.”). 
 84.  Even those who have engaged philosophically with the metaphysical status of the corporation 
have tended to make an uncritical analytical jump from arguments establishing the management layer’s 
culpability to the culpability of entire organizations. See Matthew Caulfield & William S. Laufer, 
Corporate Moral Agency at the Convenience of Ethics and Law, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 953, 970–71 
(2019) (“Accounts of corporate moral agency often focus on the management of corporations to establish 
moral agency. It is not clear . . . why these arguments result in identifying the corporation wholly as a 
moral agent, rather than its management team. Without a more expansive notion of agency, several of 
the most prominent accounts fail to establish why the entire organization is accountable as a group rather 
than merely the relevant management layer—Executive Board, middle management, what have you.”). 
 85.  See generally United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[W]e 
conclude that as a general rule a corporation is liable under the Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in 
the scope of their employment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and express instructions 
to the agent.”). 
 86.  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 87.  Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial 
Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 59 (2007). 
 88.  See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 
1505 (2007) (“It is also true that liability can be imposed on corporations for the actions of corporate 
employees, even in the absence of specific proof of corporate fault. This is not unique.”); Erin L. Sheley, 
Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea, 97 N.C. L. REV. 773, 777 (2019) (“I identify 
a significant area in which criminal respondeat superior . . . is under inclusive. Specifically, the current 
requirement than an employee must intend to benefit the corporation has the effect of shielding even 
reckless or knowing corporate employers from liability in the very worst criminal cases: those of physical 
and sexual violence by employees committed in connection with their employment.”). 
 89.  Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1663 (2007). 
06 - DIAMANTIS - THE BODY CORPORATE - AUTHOR PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2021  3:01 PM 
No. 4 2020] THE BODY CORPORATE 151 
 
• “[Respondeat superior] create[s] an enormous risk of making 
corporations vulnerable to overinclusive criminal penalties.”90 
• “In the area of corporate crime, companies . . . have no choice given the 
overbreadth of the respondeat superior standard of liability.”91 
• “[V]icarious corporate guilt [under respondeat superior] is 
extraordinarily broad.”92 
An overbroad doctrine of corporate liability is bad for criminal justice. It unfairly 
punishes corporations (and by extension all of their stakeholders).93 It over-
deters by incentivizing wasteful levels of compliance.94 It distorts the criminal 
justice process by super-charging prosecutorial power.95 
B. The Better View: As to The Body Corporate, Too Narrow 
Before taking corrective measures to pare back respondeat superior, we 
should be confident that the doctrine actually is overbroad. Otherwise, we may 
end up failing to hold corporations accountable when it would suit criminal 
justice goals to do so. 
The standard view on respondeat superior is imprecise. It fails to appreciate 
that respondeat superior actually encompasses two doctrines—one for the body 
corporate (identifying corporate acts with employee acts) and one for the 
corporate mind (identifying corporate thoughts with employee thoughts). To say 
that respondeat superior is overbroad implies that, both as to body and as to 
mind, the doctrine includes too much. Two lines of argument would be needed, 
where only one is offered. 
At least as to the body corporate, the standard view is clearly wrong: 
respondeat superior is too narrow. The aspirational definition of the body 
corporate offered in the previous Part would include as parts of the body 
corporate all aspects, features, and mechanisms of corporations that cause harm. 
That definition certainly encompasses individual employees. Respondeat 
superior gets that part right. However, by limiting itself to individual employees, 
the doctrine overlooks other potent sources of corporate harm. In other work, I 
have argued that corporate algorithms are one significant source of harm that the 
 
 90.  Stacey Neumann Vu, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of 
Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 466 (2004). 
 91.  Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code”: Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 59 n.18 (2014). 
 92.  Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and “Good Corporate 
Citizenship,” 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 983–84 (2002). 
 93.  See BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC 194 
(2019) (“Fundamentally, it is impossible to punish a corporation without indirectly affecting its individual 
stakeholders.”); Jill E. Fisch, Criminalization of Corporate Law: The Impact on Shareholders and Other 
Constituents, 2 J. BUS. TECH. L. 91, 93 (2007). 
 94.  See Diamantis, supra note 22, at 324–35 (“[U]nder a broad definition of corporate knowledge, 
corporations would likely make wasteful investments in excessive compliance.”). 
 95.  O’Sullivan, supra note 91, at 62, 67. 
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law should attribute to corporations.96 The following Subpart discusses two more: 
collective action and corporate systems. 
If the law does not hold corporations accountable for these sources of harm, 
it cannot induce responsible precaution. This is because the sources of harm are 
attributable to no one if not to a corporation.97 Employees cannot be convicted 
for innocent contributions to collective harms.98 Systems are not cognizable 
criminal defendants. Yet unlike other harms with no identifiable agential 
source—like damage from an earthquake—harms that flow out of corporations 
are preventable and provoke the public’s retributive ire. Corporate criminal law 
must be able to tie such harms to corporations if it is to have any chance of 
punishing corporations’ culpable involvement or incentivizing necessary 
corporate reform. 
1. Collective Employee Conduct 
Though respondeat superior includes every employee, it treats them as 
isolated parts of the body corporate. Assuming the scope and intent requirements 
are satisfied, each time an employee behaves, so does her corporate employer. In 
group contexts, the activity is often distributed across multiple group members.99 
Its collective significance can be greater than the contributions of each individual. 
Groups of employees can engage in harmful conduct without any individual 
employee doing the same. Conspiracy and complicity can help with cases where 
there is a coordinating hand or implicit agreement. However, those doctrines 
have no applicability in common cases where individuals are ignorant of their 
collective effect. 
This is a familiar point to joint action theorists.100 Some joint actions involve 
participants each fully performing the action they jointly perform. If two people 
walk together, they both walk. Other joint actions, however, involve participants 
 
 96.  See Diamantis, supra note 64 (manuscript at 8) (“Corporations develop, run, and maintain the 
world’s most impactful algorithms. In such cases, I claim that algorithmic action is a species of corporate 
action . . . . Recognizing that corporations act through their algorithms would similarly encourage 
corporations to exercise responsible control over algorithmic injuries.”). 
 97.  In certain circumstances, the collective action of individual employees may be attributable to 
corporate officers. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278, 281, 285 (1943) (convicting 
the individual officer but acquitting the corporation); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 660, 676–78 
(1975) (holding liable the president of the corporation for violations resulting from food exposed to 
rodent contamination). 
 98.  The employees in United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987), were all 
acquitted. The bank was convicted because their innocent acts aggregated to corporate misconduct. See 
id. at 856–59 (“Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties 
and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes the 
corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one 
component of an operation know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect . . . 
.”). 
 99.  Vu, supra note 44, at 471 (“The deeds of any number of employees . . . can collectively embody 
the actus reus for a single corporate crime.”). 
 100.  See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING 
TOGETHER (2014) (discussing the foundations of sociality). 
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each making an incomplete contribution. If four people lift a heavy cart, they lift 
it together; none does it individually. If two people bake a cake, one person cracks 
the eggs, the other beats them; neither standing alone makes a cake. Such effects 
can also happen unintentionally, as when we all cause a traffic jam by leaving 
when the workday ends; none of us intends to cause a traffic jam. Indeed, we 
probably all prefer for traffic to flow freely. To see the joint action for what it is, 
one has to aggregate the individual contributions. 
A similar sort of problem (and more familiar to corporate lawyers) arises for 
the corporate mind. For example, knowledge can be distributed across multiple 
employees, each knowing some relevant facts but none knowing them all. One 
employee may know that certain transactions must be reported to authorities. 
Another may know that such a transaction has occurred. And yet, neither may 
know that a report is owed.101 Under a strict respondeat superior approach to the 
corporate mind, the corporation also would be ignorant of the required report. 
This is because respondeat superior only lifts mental states from individual 
employees for attribution to employers. The doctrine thereby gives corporations 
a way to immunize themselves from liability for certain crimes. They only have 
to keep information dispersed and prevent any individual employee from 
knowing too much. To close this liability loophole, a minority of jurisdictions102 
supplement respondeat superior with a mental state aggregation principle: the 
collective knowledge doctrine.103 In these jurisdictions, corporations know each 
separate fact known by each employee (what the reporting threshold is and that 
the threshold has been surpassed) and know all the facts together (that a report 
must be filed).104 
Respondeat superior includes no equivalent aggregation principle for 
corporate action. This is a product of the fact that respondeat superior, as applied 
by criminal courts, only attributes employees’ misconduct to corporations. If no 
employee acts wrongfully—perhaps because each only does some small part of a 
wrongful act—no employee forms part of the criminal law’s understanding of the 
body corporate.105 
 
 101.  See, e.g., Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 847–48 (affirming a corporate defendant’s 
convictions for failure to file currency transaction reports according to timing requirements under the 
Currency Transaction Reporting Act). 
 102.  See Bharara, supra note 87, at 64 (“The collective knowledge doctrine has also received 
significant attention in the literature, much of it negative.”). 
 103.  See Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 856 (discussing the collective knowledge doctrine). 
 104.  Actually, even aggregation is not enough; the court must also allow attribution of logical 
inferences from the aggregate knowledge. See generally Diamantis, supra note 8 (discussing a new 
approach that would allow factfinders to attribute mental states to corporations as they do to natural 
people). 
 105.  The leading case on aggregating innocent employee contributions to criminal conduct is Bank 
of New England. That case focused on aggregating employee mental states rather than acts. The act 
element of the statute at issue was an omission—failing to file a report. Aggregation is a non-issue for 
omission crimes. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 847 (“The Act imposes felony liability when a bank 
willfully fails to file such reports . . . .”). 
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This is counterintuitive and a clear shortfall from the aspirational definition 
of the body corporate. For natural people, it would be as if the criminal law 
treated the operation of each body part separately—a hand could close each 
finger individually, but not make a fist. For corporate people, it leads to similar 
absurdities. If a single employee performs all the behavior constituting a harmful 
act, then the corporation, acting through her, did too. However, if different 
employees each perform discrete parts of the same act causing the same harm, 
they do not act as parts of the criminal law’s conception of the body corporate.106 
Just as with culpable knowledge in the absence of a knowledge aggregation 
principle, respondeat superior’s approach to corporate action sets up a liability 
loophole. 
Consider, for example, a case where several agents of a corporation, without 
any coordination between them, make separate, relatively small payments to a 
foreign official to secure progress on some business enterprise. While the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act prohibits bribes of foreign officials, it does not apply to 
“facilitating . . . payment[s],” which are made “to expedite or to secure the 
performance of a routine governmental action.”107 While the line between 
facilitating payments and bribes is notoriously hard to draw,108 the size of the 
payment can play an important role.109 Under the strict terms of respondeat 
superior, the corporation in the example only ever made innocent facilitating 
payments—that, after all, is all that each individual employee did. Consider, 
though, that the payments taken together could have the sort of corrupting 
influence that anti-bribery laws are supposed to target. The law has a self-
inflicted blind spot. 
The aspirational definition of the body corporate offers a better approach. It 
would do for individual employee action what the collective knowledge doctrine 
does for individual employee knowledge: aggregate and attribute. Employees 
acting together are no less parts of a corporation than employees acting 
separately because they can cause harm while acting together just as often as, and 
even more than, they can while acting individually. By aggregating the facilitation 
 
 106.  I am assuming there are no further acts manifesting agreement or encouragement between the 
employees. 
 107.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2(b) (2018). 
 108.  See generally Charles B. Weinograd, Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence 
by Defining the Scope of the Routine Governmental Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 509 (2010) 
(discussing the vague nature of the routine governmental action exception); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CRIM. DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENF’T DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 25 (2012) (“Whether a payment falls within the exception is not dependent 
on the size of the payment, though size can be telling . . . .”). 
 109.  Morgan Chu & Daniel Magraw, The Deductibility of Questionable Foreign Payments, 87 YALE 
L.J. 1091, 1119–20 (1978) (“Nondeductible bribes and deductible extortion payments might also be 
distinguished by their size. The size of Octopus’s $100,000 payment to the agent suggests that it was not 
made to obtain a service or result that would ordinarily be forthcoming from the government. By 
contrast, the size of the $200 payment to the harbormaster suggests that it was nothing more than a 
‘grease payment’ to facilitate that which should ordinarily be forthcoming to the payor.”). 
06 - DIAMANTIS - THE BODY CORPORATE - AUTHOR PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2021  3:01 PM 
No. 4 2020] THE BODY CORPORATE 155 
 
payments in the previous example, the true and potentially corrupt relationship 
between the corporation and the foreign official may come into focus. The 
aspirational approach to the body corporate would recognize this by identifying 
all employees as simultaneous parts of the body corporate. On this account, 
corporations act through them, doing all they do, regardless of whether the acts 
are simultaneous or sequential, performed by just one employee or dispersed 
across many. 
2. Corporate Systems 
Organizational scientists have long recognized that corporate-level systems 
can be just as important as employees in shaping what corporations do.110 
“Organizations are systems . . . not just aggregations of individuals.”111 Corporate 
ethos or culture has a significant influence on how a corporation impacts the 
world around it.112 Corporate culture is premised on shared understandings, 
practices, and histories that bring some features of the environment to social 
salience.113 A corporation, for example, may have an ethical culture characterized 
by a shared practical orientation toward honesty and integrity as overriding 
concerns. Alternatively, honesty and integrity may recede into the background if 
personal performance metrics become the salient social currency. Business 
ethicists and corporate scholars have had an enduring interest in how corporate 
culture shapes employee behavior and how to change corporate culture to make 
it a positive influence.114 “Corporate crime can be produced by an organization’s 
structure, its culture, its unquestioned assumptions, or its very modus 
operandi.”115 Underwriters who use sophisticated analysis to price corporate 
 
 110.  I have previously argued that such structures and systems may even be what corporations 
essentially are. See generally Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Essence and Identity in Criminal Law, 154 
J. BUS. ETHICS 955 (2019) (developing a theory of corporate personal identity); Mihailis E. Diamantis, 
Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2019) (offering an approach to successor liability premised on 
corporate personal identity). 
 111.  Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 479 (1988). See also Joey P. 
Cornelissen, S. Alexander Haslam & John M. T. Balmer, Social Identity, Organizational Identity and 
Corporate Identity: Towards an Integrated Understanding of Processes, Patternings and Products, 18 BRIT. 
J. MGMT. S1, S8 (2007) (“[C]ollective identities (whether social, organizational or corporate) are . . . 
associated with behavior that is qualitatively different from that associated with lower-order identities . . 
. .”). 
 112.  See, e.g., FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND ‘PUNISH OR PERSUADE’ 25 (1997) 
(“Organizational culture forms the ‘touchstone’ by which individuals behave and act.”). 
 113.  See generally EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949) (analyzing white collar 
crime through a detailed investigation of legal violations by various large corporations). 
 114.  See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 11, at 1099–101 (discussing how corporate ethos can “encourage” 
certain kinds of employee behavior); Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 3, 30, 64 (2012); Moore, supra note 82, at 753 (characterizing corporate character in terms of the 
“goals, rules, policies, and procedures that are features of the corporation as an entity”); Martin L. 
Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two Models of Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 
517 (1979). 
 115.  Frank Pearce, Crime and Capitalist Business Corporations, in CRIMES OF PRIVILEGE: 
READINGS IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 35, 35–37 (Neal Shover & John Paul Wright eds., 2001). 
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insurance maintain that corporate “[c]ulture and character . . . are at least as 
important as and perhaps more important than other, more readily observable” 
risk factors.116 
Corporate policies and procedures also influence the opportunities and 
incentives employees have to engage in certain forms of behavior. Aggressive 
quotas and productivity-based compensation metrics can encourage 
employees—who wish to keep their job and advance in it—to prioritize numbers 
over more humanistic concerns.117 Organization-level features can also 
discourage certain forms of behavior, by increasing detection rates and exposing 
employees who engage in that behavior to penalties.118 Other systems can operate 
more directly by enabling or disabling certain courses of conduct—an employee 
who lacks credentials to access customer accounts cannot misuse them. 
In earlier work, I referred to such corporate systems as partially constituting 
a corporation’s “character.”119 I discussed the role that character could play in 
helping the law to calibrate corporate punishment.120 Here the emphasis is 
different. Corporate systems should be considered part of the body corporate 
because they shape what corporations do and whether and how corporations 
cause harm. While respondeat superior focuses exclusively on employee 
behavior, corporate systems are sometimes the more potent source of corporate 
misconduct. Employees adapt to corporate procedures, rules, and culture.121 This 
means that otherwise upstanding individuals can find themselves and their 
workplace shaped by defective corporate systems. From this perspective, 
individuals can become fungible parts of a corrupt body corporate. In such 
systems, “[p]ersonnel changes will seldom lead to real changes in the 
organization’s behavior and work processes.”122 Corporate systems can take on a 
life and momentum of their own, shaping all levels of the corporate hierarchy.123 
 
 116.  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the 
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 517 (2007). 
 117.  E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z9BT-G49P] (discussing how the high-pressure sales environment of Wells Fargo led 
to large-scale moral and ethical breaches). 
 118.  Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic 
Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 11, 18 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow 
eds., 2011). 
 119.  See generally Diamantis, supra note 8. 
 120.  See generally Diamantis, supra note 69. 
 121.  JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 427 (1990) (“[Employees] take on the 
obligations and expectations, the goals and resources, associated with their positions in the way they put 
on work clothes for their jobs.”). 
 122.  Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and 
Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 64 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 688 (2000). 
 123.  Gilbert Geis, Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Origins, Patterns, and Reactions, in 
CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 7 (M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman eds., 5th ed. 1996). 
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The systems, rather than the employees who operate within them, are sometimes 
the root cause of criminal harm. 
To some extent, there is overlap between adding corporate systems and 
adding aggregate employee behavior to the body corporate. Since a significant 
way in which systems have their effect is by impacting how employees behave, 
aggregate employee behavior could technically capture this effect. However, a 
systems-level perspective can sometimes make corporate behavior more 
perspicuous than trying to aggregate individual contributions. For example, 
suppose a corporation conceals damaging information from regulators. One 
could describe what the corporation did as the aggregate effect of individual 
decisions by hundreds of employees about whether and what information to 
report up the corporate hierarchy. Alternatively, one could describe it, supposing 
the facts were supportive, as the effect of a standing internal norm or policy 
against acknowledging compromising information. 
While both employee-level and systems-level accounts show how the 
corporation caused the harmful effect (concealing information from regulators), 
distinctly conceptualizing the systems-level account is important for a few 
reasons. First, it gives enforcement authorities a conceptual lens that may make 
it easier to apprehend and evaluate what the corporation is doing. Second, the 
systems-level account can give insight into the depth and significance of the 
misconduct. Employee behavior that coincidentally amounts in the aggregate to 
a non-reporting event is very different from behavior that is coordinated by 
explicit or implicit norms. And third, legitimating the systems-level explanation 
can help in the courtroom where prosecutors have to explain corporate 
misconduct in intuitive terms to lay jurors. 
There is also some harm attribution that a systems-level account of corporate 
conduct can accomplish that the aggregate employee behavior account cannot. 
This is because there are circumstances in which what employees are doing 
crucially depends on the organizational context in which they are doing it. 
Suppose, for example, that a mid-level employee is making compensation and 
promotion decisions for her subordinates. Looking back on the final decisions 
she made, people who exceeded performance quotas were more likely to receive 
bonuses and promotions, regardless of how well they fared in compliance audits 
of their work. Whether awarding the bonuses and promotions constitutes 
encouragement to shirk compliance standards, to boost productivity, or both, 
might turn on the policies and procedures that the mid-level manager followed. 
It makes a big difference whether the corporation’s formal compensation metrics 
explicitly discount audit results, explicitly award points for exceeding quota 
expectations, or leave decisions entirely to the discretion of mid-level 
management. 
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V 
CONCLUSION: FLESHING OUT THE BODY CORPORATE 
By distinguishing the body corporate from the corporate mind, corporate law 
could claim for itself some of the nuance available to law as applied to individuals. 
Presently, corporate law attributes both acts and mental states under a single 
doctrine. By defining the body corporate, this Article opens the possibility of 
treating them separately, with different doctrines better tailored to their 
functional roles in the administration of justice. Regardless of what the best 
account of the corporate mind is, the law should not rely on an overly narrow 
conception of the body corporate that is blind to many harms corporations cause. 
After the full breadth of the harms that corporate bodies cause is on the table, an 
enlightened understanding of the corporate mind can set to work helping identify 
which corporations are culpable for the harms they cause. 
Even if the aspirational definition of the body corporate—which identifies 
corporate bodies with all aspects, mechanisms, and features of corporations that 
cause harm—is correct, it is incomplete. It presumes that we have some way of 
determining which aspects, mechanisms, and features belong to a corporation 
and to which corporation they belong. The presentation above implicitly relied 
on an intuitive sense of how to pair corporations with aspects, mechanisms, and 
features. In the absence of a worked-out theory or a formal doctrine, the need 
for that intuitive sensibility means that the definition of the body corporate 
remains incomplete. When, for example, is a mechanism that causes harm part of 
a corporation and when is it a part of the regulatory environment of the industry 
in which it operates? If two corporations share a mechanism—perhaps one 
corporation leases a warehouse from another—to which does it belong? A 
general theory of the body corporate would help the law determine which 
aspects, mechanisms, and features of corporations are associated with which 
corporate body. That is a task for future work. 
 
